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Abstract 
Theories of antonymy have traditionally been based on semantics, with some studies offering a 
cognitive approach as an alternative. However, neither approach has been able to account for the 
use of antonyms in discourse. This theoretical paper suggests a new cognitive approach based on 
the framework of cognitive metaphor theory, which could potentially account for discourse 
observations. The paper suggests methods to investigate the cognitive reality of this claim, and 
discusses its implications for human cognition. 
 
1. The opposite of a conclusion 
This paper aims to suggest a new approach to a topic in cognitive semantics, namely the nature of 
antonymy. Antonyms have been extensively described from many approaches, as they are widely 
agreed to be the most robust type of semantic relationship between lexemes. Antonymy is both the 
most easily identified semantic relationship, and it is extremely common in natural language, both 
with and without speakers' explicit acknowledgement (Murphy 2003: 169). Its relevance to the 
study of human cognition is evident: Arguably, the nature of semantic relations, including 
antonyms, can indicate how humans conceptualize the world around them (Stocker 2015). 
However, previous theories of antonymy have in some respects fallen short when confronted with 
actual language data (Lobanova et al. 2010). This paper presents the outline of an alternative 
approach based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), a theoretical framework which has been 
demonstrated to underlie a number of linguistic mechanisms (Gibbs 2017). The paper argues that 
the concept of opposition is a fundamental part of the human conceptualisation of the world, 
making antonymy a linguistic manifestation of such conceptualisations.  In this way, a theory of 
antonymy based on CMT could provide a framework to better explain the phenomenon as we see it 
in actual language use. As a framework, CMT is a particularly appropriate candidate for such a 
theory, since it already describes a set of well-established mechanisms which link conceptualisation 
to linguistic expression, which is yet to be applied in existing theories of antonymy. 
The aim of this paper is to propose an approach to antonymy whose psychological reality can be 
empirically tested. Previous studies have found that the established categorization of antonyms into 
for example gradable antonyms, non-gradable antonyms, and converses is not validated by actual 
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discourse data (as discussed in Lobanova et al. 2010: 43). The purpose of this paper is to provide an 
alternative cognitive model of antonymy in the hopes that this will better align with the observed 
use of antonymy in language. This first section of the paper is an introduction to the aims of the 
paper. Section 2 contains brief accounts of relevant previous research in the fields of antonymy 
research and CMT. Section 3 discusses the claim of this paper. Finally, Section 4 contains a short 
summary and conclusion. The overall aim of this paper is to propose a potential new direction for 
future research on antonymy, exemplified with an outline of a theoretical model. 
2. Existing literature 
This section will serve as an overview of previous research relevant to the claim of this paper. The 
materials cited can broadly be divided into two separate bodies of research: Antonymy and CMT. 
2.1. Antonymy Research 
Antonymy has been studied with many different theoretical approaches. In this section I will briefly 
review three of these: The theoretical-semantic approach, the discourse-analytic approach, and the 
cognitive-semantic approach. For a more thorough summary of the history of antonymy research, 
see Jones et al. (2012: chapter 1). 
In the theoretical-semantic approach, antonymy pairs have traditionally been sorted into a number 
of subcategories depending on semantic criteria, going back as far as the observations of Aristotle. 
The exact number and nature of the categories has varied depending on the aims of different 
researchers. Arguably the most commonly used set of categories is as follows: Gradable antonyms, 
also called true antonyms (antonyms which are gradable on a scale, such as HAPPY/SAD), non-
gradable antonyms, also called opposites (mutually exclusive antonyms, such as DEAD/ALIVE, 
where something is always described by one of the terms, but never both), and converses, also 
called multiple incompatibles (antonyms which are, as the name suggests, sets of multiple mutually 
incompatible terms). However, Lobanova et al. note that "psycholinguistic studies of antonyms 
suggest these distinctions [the three aforementioned categories] do not play a role in the way 
antonyms are represented in the mental lexicon" (2010: 21). This conclusion is based on numerous 
studies described in the same paper (Deese 1964, 1965; Charles and Miller 1989; Kučera and 
Francis 1967; Justeson and Katz 1991; Fellbaum 1998), which explore antonymy in various ways.  
Through psycholinguistic experiments, the studies find a certain set of antonyms which they label 
as canonical, but which are not adequately explained by purely semantic criteria. This suggests that 
the purely semantic established definitions, while terminologically useful, do not accurately 
represent the cognitive landscape of the human language faculties. 
With this in mind, it is useful to consider antonymy from a perspective other than the purely 
theoretical-semantic. One such candidate is through discourse analysis: Categorising antonymy 
pairs by the different functions they can have in conversations. These functions are discussed by 
Jones (2007), who uses discourse functions rather than semantic criteria when investigating the 
differences in the nature of antonymy in children versus in adults. Based on his data, Jones divides 
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discourse functions into nine discursive categories, two of which are by far more common than the 
rest. These are ancillery antonymy (in which a pair of antonyms is used to highlight contrastive 
features of a corresponding pair of terms or phrases, e.g. "The worst episode of Frasier beats the 
best episode of Friends") and coordinated antonymy (in which a pair of antonyms is used to denote 
opposing ends of a spectrum, usually in order to refer to everything within that spectrum, e.g. "We 
serve everything from pumpkin spice latte to regular black coffee").  
The significance of discursive functions is further explored by Lobanova (2012:21-24), who uses a 
corpus-driven approach to establish functionally distinct uses of antonymy naturally occurring in 
speech. Among other things, the study finds that noun-noun pairs are represented far more in 
collections of antonyms identified by algorithms than when identified based on semantic criteria, 
again casting doubt on the psychological reality of the established semantic categories. A relevant 
question here is whether the established semantic categories are even compatible with the findings 
of these more recent usage-based studies. For the purposes of this paper, I take the view that both 
types of categorisation (those based on semantic features and those based on usage patterns) shed 
light on aspects of the nature of antonymy, but that for such a categorisation to have meaningful 
implications about human cognition, a theoretical model must correlate with observable data, such 
as in the psycholinguistic studies discussed by Lobanova et al. (2010:21-23). 
Paradis and Willners (2011) posit a framework of antonymy which, broadly speaking, bases the 
phenomenon in cognitive semantics, and thus attempts to establish a more psychologically accurate 
theory of antonyms. The study works within the framework of Lexical Meaning as Ontologies and 
Construals (ibid: 2), which views conceptualisation as a process arising from structures and 
construals (with different subcategories under each of these terms). Here, structures describe how 
we conceptualise the constituent elements of the world, and construals describe how we 
conceptualise the relations between them (Paradis 2005). It concludes that "antonyms are meanings 
that are used in binary opposition through a construal of comparison" (2011: 383). This construal is 
a mental 'border' along which the semantic features of any given antonymy pair are compared. For 
example, in the antonymy pair 'TALL/SHORT', the construal is the border of height, along which 
the semantic features of the two terms are compared. Within this framework, an antonymy pair is, 
cognitively speaking, two lexical items whose relationship is defined by a specific type of construal: 
a comparison of features. Paradis and Willners provide a cognitive framework for the 
conceptualisation of antonymy, but do not link this to discursive functions. As an alternative, this 
paper suggests a theory that might be able to connect the cognitive and discursive findings from the 
papers described so far. 
2.2. Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
The seminal work of CMT is Lakoff & Johnson (1980), in which the theory and its base 
implications are first presented. The basic claims of the theory are as follows: Rather than just a 
rhetorical flourish, metaphor is a crucial mechanism in conceptualisation which helps humans to 
understand concepts by comparing them to other concepts. Typically, the concept that we use in 
order to understand (called the source domain) is more integral to the human experience than the 
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concept being understood (called the target domain). This means that certain concepts, mostly those 
directly involving the physical experience of having a human body, are employed to understand 
more abstract ideas. CMT further claims that the source domain used in a metaphor hides some 
aspects of the target domain while highlighting others. The theory views metaphors in language as 
an expression of the conceptual metaphors in our minds, and the same conceptual metaphor can, 
and usually does, have multiple linguistic expressions. 
An example of a conceptual metaphor is ARGUMENT IS WAR, in which the abstract concept 
'argument' is conceptualised in terms of the concrete experience of physical fights. Lakoff and 
Johnson list multiple examples of expressions of this metaphor, such as "Your claims are 
indefensible" and "I've never won an argument with him" (ibid: 4). In this case, the source domain 
highlights the competitive aspects of an argument and hides others, such as the potential goal of 
learning from each other's perspective (since that is a part of the concept 'argument', but not 'war'). 
One part of the framework posits the existence of 'orientational metaphors', a type of metaphor 
often used for abstract concepts such as emotions, values, or morals. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson, "[...] most of them have to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, 
deep-shallow, central-peripheral" (1980:14). An example of orientational metaphor in action can be 
seen in the expression "to rise above something", in reference to a person who chooses not to 
engage in conflict in reaction to someone else's actions, insults or differing opinions. This 
expression is built on the orientational metaphor RATIONAL IS UP. 
3. The claim 
When Lakoff and Johnson define the concept of orientational metaphors (1980: 14), all of their 
examples are pairs of antonyms. Based on this observation, this paper's central claim can be stated 
as follows: Antonymy pairs are cognitively framed in terms of a metaphorical experiential basis. 
More specifically, a comparatively small number of antonymy pairs - those described as 
orientational metaphors - constitute the source domains for our conceptualisation of all other 
antonymy pairs. For example, the antonymy pair UP/DOWN, which is described by Lakoff and 
Johnson as the source domain in some orientational metaphors (1980: 14), is the source domain for 
the antonymy pair HAPPY/SAD, where UP is the orientational metaphor for HAPPY, and DOWN 
is the orientational metaphor for SAD. This paper proposes that antonymy pairs can be sorted into 
two different categories: Intrinsic antonyms and non-intrinsic antonyms. Intrinsic antonyms make 
up the source domains of orientational metaphors. Their constituent concepts are directly 
experienced in the physical world, and so is their intrinsic oppositeness. Examples include 
UP/DOWN or INSIDE/OUTSIDE. These pairs are intrinsically antonymous. In contrast, non-
intrinsic antonyms are not intrinsically antonymous, but are nevertheless viewed by speakers as 
indisputably antonymous. Examples include HAPPY/SAD and FIRE/WATER. Concepts found in 
this category may have more than one antonym each. For example, HAPPY can be the antonym of 
SAD, but also of ANGRY. In contrast, UP has only one antonym: DOWN. Thus, this paper claims 
that we perceive e.g. HAPPY and SAD as antonyms not because the concepts they denote are 
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intrinsically opposite, but because we conceptualise them via UP and DOWN, respectively, which 
are intrinsically opposite.  
The most useful approach to testing this claim would be a multi-faceted research project collecting 
many different types of data. Different types of data could include brain scans (such as magneto- 
and electroencephalography), conversation analysis, psycholinguistic laboratory experiments, 
language user surveys or studies of patients with aphasia. Brain scans, psycholinguistic 
experiments, language user surveys and studies of aphasia may shed light on the neurological and 
psychological underpinnings of antonymy. Neurologically, the two categories of antonymy pairs 
may elicit different neurological responses in speakers and listeners. Psycholinguistic experiments 
may reveal whether the categories are differently affected by phenomena such as priming, or 
whether they influence reaction times. For example, the claim would be supported if non-intrinsic 
pairs are observed to have a higher reaction time, or if the effect of priming is observed to be 
stronger in intrinsic pairs (in both cases due to intrinsic pairs being closer connected in meaning). 
Conversation analysis could establish whether the two categories have different functions in 
conversation, such as one category preceding longer hesitations than the other, or being used more 
often to create contexual antonymies. The claim would similarly be supported if studies of patients 
with aphasia were to reveal the possibility of losing either use of understanding of some or all non-
intrinsic antonymy pairs, but not the intrinsic. The proposed claim could be used as a theoretical 
basis to account for the discourse observations of Lobanova et al. (2010), which is something 
Lobanova et al. observe that existing frameworks fail to do. In doing so, it would provide an 
alternative to Jones (2002) and Paradis & Willners (2011). This makes the claim a potential basis 
for future research, and a help to more accurately determine the cognitive role of metaphor and 
opposition. If supported, the theory would also support the CMT framework as a whole. 
One question of particular interest, should this theory be empirically supported, is the nature and 
number of non-metaphorical antonymy pairs - that is, the antonymy pairs that form the 
metaphorical basis of other antonymy pairs. Other than Lakoff and Johnson's original orientational 
metaphors (1980: 14), I have been unable to think of many true such pairs, and the only ones that 
come to mind are directional antonyms, i.e. UP/DOWN, NORTH/SOUTH. Is it likely that 
directions are the only true example of opposition that occurs in nature? And, if so, are all antonyms 
in human language metaphorical extensions of that one opposition? One could argue that an 
opposition such as ALIVE/DEAD occurs non-metaphorically in nature, but the fact that one term 
denotes simply the absence of the other could mean that the terms actually cover related, mutually 
exclusive, but not technically opposite concepts - that is, not opposite without the involvement of 
human conceptualisation. This question has far-reaching implications for human cognition, but 
requires a solid theoretical foundation to investigate, which this theory could begin to provide. 
3.2. Points of criticism 
Following the presented theory, there are a number of factors which would be likely to complicate 
any empirical testing and which should be kept in mind. First, one major complicating factor is the 
effect of negation morphemes. In psycholinguistic experiments, for example, antonymy pairs where 
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one term is identical to the other term, but with a negation morpheme added (such as 
HAPPY/UNHAPPY), it is likely that HAPPY would elicit UNHAPPY as its antonym in speakers 
of English far more consistently than other properties of the words allow this model to predict; and 
it is to be expected that the effect would be even stronger the other way around, with UNHAPPY 
eliciting HAPPY almost without exception. In the testing of any model based on this paper's claim, 
this should be considered a source of error. In experiments involving researcher-picked stimuli, the 
issue can be partially addressed by avoiding the use of these words when picking out stimuli - but if 
so, that discrimination of stimuli will itself be a source of error to take into account when drawing 
conclusions. 
Second, the theory can be argued to be incompatible with other well-established approaches. One 
example of this is the approach of Jones et al. (2012: 8-10), in turn adapted from Murphy (2003). In 
this view, antonymy is primarily viewed as arising from context, with some antonymy pairs (known 
as canonical antonyms) becoming universally accepted within one or more languages by way of 
repetition. According to this framework, a pair becomes canonical when it is used often enough in a 
context that construes it as antonymous for speakers to register and internalise it as such. Contextual 
antonymy is in itself an extremely common and well-documented phenomenon and has been shown 
to affect the judgement of language users in antonymy research (Van de Weijer et al. 2014). For this 
reason, studies of antonymy tend to benefit from clearly delineating the distinction between 
canonical and contextual antonyms. The view taken here is that this paper's claim is in fact 
compatible with the approach of Jones et al. (2012), which defines the criteria of how contextual 
antonymies arise, but not the cognitive mechanisms behind that process. However, contextual 
antonymy does give rise to another apparent issue with this claim. Through contextual antonymy, 
practically anything can - with a little linguistic innovation - be construed as the antonym of 
anything else. This seems to contradict the idea that antonyms stem from orientational metaphors, 
since there may not always be an obvious orientational metaphor for every instance of contextual 
antonymy. This apparent inconsistency can, however, be explained by considering the individual 
features of each lexical item in this context. In the example sentence "I'd rather die than colour my 
hair", 'to die' is contextually made antonymous with 'to colour my hair', which is not commonly the 
case, and which brings no obvious orientational metaphor to mind. However, the two terms are 
compared on only one of their features, namely their agreeableness to the speaker (from the 
speaker's perspective, simply 'goodness'), and it's evident from the context that the former has more 
of that than the latter. Murphy (2003: 170) describes that antonymy arises exactly from the 
comparison between lexical items which "have all the same contextually relevant properties but 
one". In this case, that one contextually relevant property is 'goodness'. To see how this fits with this 
paper's claim, we now no longer have to identify an orientational metaphor that maps onto 'die' and 
'colour my hair', but instead onto 'good' and 'bad' - and as discussed in Lakoff & Johnson (1980:16-
17), the orientational metaphor UP/DOWN does exactly that. 
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4. The opposite of an introduction 
The human ability to use opposition as a tool of conceptualisation might stem from the 
metaphorical extension of oppositions found in the way humans experience the world. Antonymy, 
being the linguistic expression of that ability, is suggested in this paper to arise from orientational 
metaphors. This paper presents the claim that there are two types of antonym pairs: Intrinsic and 
non-intrinsic. While intrinsic antonym pairs are directly experienced in the physical world, non-
intrinsic antonym pairs are not intrinsically opposite, but are considered opposites due to the 
metaphors through which they are conceptualized. The present paper seeks to communicate this 
idea, and to provide useful context for any further studies, including a summary of relevant previous 
research as well as a discussion of how to test this claim. Investigations of this claim could 
potentially shed light on aspects of human cognition and play a role in semantics as a novel 
framework for studying antonymy, complementing a number of existing approaches. 
Future investigations on the topic might include a multi-faceted research project such as that 
described in Section 3, in order to test the claim. Another approach would be through language user 
surveys, which could investigate whether the proposed distinction between intrinsic and non-
intrinsic antonymies affects speakers' attitudes to antonyms differently. 
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